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Abstract
The spread of HIV and AIDS and risky sexual behavior continues to be a prob-
lem in Sub-Saharan African countries despite government measures to educate people
on the risk and severity of the disease and measures to promote safe sex practices
such as making condoms readily available at reduced or no cost. We examine whether
people decide to engage in risky sexual behavior due to low income and low life ex-
pectancy. Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by conditions that signiﬁcantly reduce
life expectancy such as unsanitary conditions prevalent in poverty stricken areas, inac-
cessibility to health care, and dangerous working conditions such as those in very poor
mining regions. Moreover, since income per capita in these countries is very low, the
opportunity cost associated with dying from AIDS and foregoing future consumption
is very low. We examine how a government provided life insurance beneﬁt may be an
eﬀective means of deterring risky sexual behavior. To evaluate this policy prescription
we develop a life-cycle model with personal and family consumption and endogenous
probability of survival. In the model, agents can receive life insurance beneﬁts if their
death is not the result of AIDS. We demonstrate that excessive risky behavior does
result from low life expectancy and low levels of income and illustrate the conditions
for which the life insurance beneﬁt can replicate the eﬀects of higher income and life
expectancy, deterring risky sexual behavior and reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS.
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1 Introduction
AIDS is an incurable disease that kills individuals during their most productive years and
is most often transmitted through consensual, unprotected sexual encounters. According
to the most recent HIV epidemic update (UNAIDS (2009)), the worldwide number of HIV
infections in 2008 was between 31 to 36 million and 2 million people worldwide died as a result
of AIDS. Sub-Saharan Africa, the epicenter of the pandemic, is responsible for approximately
two thirds of all infections and over 70% of all deaths, and the great majority of infections in
sub-Saharan Africa is due to heterosexual sex. HIV prevalence among adults in sub-Saharan
Africa is approximately 5.2%, whereas the worldwide prevalence among adults is only 0.8%.
In some sub-Saharran countries the pandemic is particularly bad: the adult HIV prevalence
reaches 26.1% in Swaziland, 23.2% in Lesotho, and 15.2% in Zambia. These numbers are
not projected to decrease any time soon.
There has been a substantial body of research, empirical and theoretical, on the eﬀects
of HIV on economic growth and development. In an early study, Over (1992) uses a two
sector model for 30 sub-Saharan African countries and ﬁnds a negative eﬀect on annaul
real GDP growth of 1%. Thereafter, other studies have found similar eﬀects on economic
growth of African economies, for example Kambou, Devarejan, and Over (1992), Cuddington
and Hancock (1994), Arndt and Lewis (2000)1, Bonnel (2000), World Bank (2001), World
Bank (2001a), World Bank (2001b), and Dixon, McDonald, and Roberts (2001). When we
compound a 1% loss in real GDP growth over many years, this eﬀect becomes very large2. In
the absence of a cure or an eﬀective prevention campaign, the evidence suggests that AIDS
in sub-Saharan Africa can be a great impediment to long-run economic growth.
The evidence above has been contested by some studies. Bloom and Mahal (1997) uses
data for 51 countries and ﬁnds no eﬀect of HIV on economic growth. Young (2005a) con-
structs and simulates a model in which HIV generates two opposing eﬀects: reduced fertility
and reduced human capital. He argues that the former eﬀect outweighs the latter imply-
ing increases in the standards of living over time. Since then, however, Corrigan, Glomm,
and Mendez (2005) show the human capital loss eﬀect is much greater when accounting
1They ﬁnd a 2.6% negative growth eﬀect.
2Many other papers have found very large long-run level eﬀects of HIV on output, including Cuddington
(1993b), Cuddington and Hancock (1995), Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis (2000), Arndt
(2003), Bell, Devarajan, and Gersbach (2003), Santaeulàlia-Llopis (2007), and de Araujo (2008).
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for inter-generational transfers in schooling decisions. This large loss in human capital is
also demonstrated by Hamoudi and Birdsall (2002) and most recently in Fortson (2008).
In short, there is strong evidence HIV/AIDS is not only a health problem, but a serious
economic problem in sub-Saharan Africa.
Because the main mode of HIV transmission in sub-Saharan Africa is through heterosex-
ual sex, eﬀorts to contain the spread of the disease has entailed educating individuals not to
have lots of unprotected sex, to be faithful to their partners, and to use condoms every time.
This strategy is being implemented through many campaigns that target high risk groups
(truck drivers, commercial sex workers, mine workers) and the general population as AIDS
in sub-Saharan Africa is now a widespread problem. The goal of these prevention campaigns
is to decrease risky sexual behavior through increased knowledge about the disease. Even
though there have been studies that document the success of prevention campaigns (Meda
et al. (1999), Green et al. (2006), and Dupas (2009)), there is not much evidence, at the
macro level, of substantial change in risky behavior in sub-Saharan Africa. For example,
Agarwal, de Araujo, and Paudel (2010) ﬁnd that increases in HIV knowledge are associated
with more condom use, but also with more pre-marital and extra-marital sex. Epstein (2007)
argues that changing sexual behavior in sub-Saharan Africa is very diﬃcult as it requires
changing social norms. In some countries in Africa, it is socially acceptable for males to have
contingent relationships. This creates a sexual network that can lead to a greater spread
of HIV than in the situation of serial monogamy. Other studies that have documented no
real change in sexual behavior in sub Saharan Africa since the advent of the AIDS epidemic
include Lindan et al. (1991), Lagarde et al. (1996), Ng'weshemi et al. (1996), Caldwell et al.
(1999), Bloom et al. (2000), Williams et al. (2003), and Stoneburner and Low-Beer (2004).
Containing HIV in sub-Saharan Africa would be much less challenging if it were possible
to dissuade risky sexual behavior. Even with millions of dollars spent on campaigns that
focus on improving HIV knowledge and education and increasing condom distribution, there
is little evidence that behavior has substantially changed at the macro level and there is rela-
tively little evidence that country-wide HIV prevalence has decreased as a result. Some have
suggested that HIV prevention campaigns have been successful in Uganda, but Oster (2007)
has shown that the aforementioned success of these campaigns are possibly misidentiﬁed.
Rather, Oster ﬁnds that the fall in HIV prevalence in Uganda during the 1990s was closely
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tied to the price of exports; that is, the major cause of the decrease in HIV prevalence was
a reduction in economic activity due to decreases in exports.
The evidence above suggests using resources to distribute condoms and educate individ-
uals about the disease might not be enough to limit risky behavior and contain the spread
of HIV. Some studies suggests the only feasible way to contain the pandemic is by creating
opportunities for these countries to surpass a certain development threshold where life ex-
pectancy and wealth are increased to levels in which the incentive to engage in risky sexual
practices is reduced. Recently, Oster (2009) concludes furthering education campaigns would
be ineﬀective as HIV knowledge in Africa is already very high; however, she does not propose
a concrete alternative.
In this paper, we suggest and evaluate such an alternative: a government provided life
insurance beneﬁt that is payable for deaths that are not the result of AIDS. We ﬁnd this
policy can replicate the deterrence of risky behavior derived from high income and high
life expectancy. We develop a life-cycle model where the decision to engage in risky sexual
behavior is endogenous and depends on, among other things, income and life expectancy.
The model incorporates an incentive structure in the spirit of Hallet and Over (2010) that
rewards households if males reduce their risky sexual behavior. We focus speciﬁcally on
married males that have family dependents. Males they have been found to be the drivers
of the pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa (Ulin (1992), Epstein (2007)), which implies that
everyone in sub-Saharan Africa would be at less risk of contracting HIV if males reduce their
risky sexual behavior. We calibrate the model to match data for Zambia and four other
sub-Saharan African countries.
We ﬁnd that this contingent life insurance can act to deter risky sexual practices in males
much the same way an increase in wealth does, and depending on parameter calibrations
may even replicate the relatively large deterrence eﬀect that comes from an increase in life
expectancy. This paper is able to match some of the same qualitative predictions made by
Oster (2005), but with a feasible policy prescription.
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2 Model
The focus of this paper is on married adult males who are the primary wage earner of their
family and have dependent family members. Such an agent can live up to four ﬁfteen-year
periods. The agent is alive through the ﬁrst period and faces a possibility of dying before
periods 2, 3, or 4, possibly from AIDS if HIV was sexually transmitted during the previous
period, or possibly from accident or another illness that is beyond the agent's control. The
ﬁrst period is thought to approximate ages 20 though 34, the second period ages 35 through
49, the third period ages 50-64, and the ﬁnal period ages 65 through 79. It is therefore
possible to live up to age 80 years, but since an agent can die from exogenous factors, the
non-AIDS life expectancy can be far below 80. The probability of survival to the next
period depends on factors beyond the a person's control (such as accidents that can result
from working in dangerous conditions or contracting non-preventable illnesses) and also a
factor the agent can control, risky sexual activity. We assume during the ﬁrst three periods
the agent is employed and earns wage income and in the ﬁnal period he is retired. He decides
how to allocate his income between his own consumption and the consumption of his other
family members.
2.1 Preferences
The agent's utility at time, t, depends on his personal consumption, ct; his family's con-
sumption, ft; and the number of risky sexual partners, mt. We assume the utility function
for a given period is additively separable over the consumption goods and sexual activity, so
that the utility in period t can be given by,
u(ct, ft,mt) = v(ct, ft) + γtw(mt), (1)
where γt is a scale parameter that determines the relative importance of consumption and
risky sexual partners. We suppose this parameter may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent periods in
the agent's life. As the agent gets older we will suppose the preference for having risky
sexual partners may decrease. If γt were to remain constant, the agent will optimally choose
to have larger and larger numbers of risky sexual partners as he gets older since there is
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less lifetime consumption and income to lose if he dies from AIDS. Since it is more common
to see the opposite behavior, people typically have fewer sexual partners in a given time
period as they age, it is likely that γt gets smaller as t gets larger. We assume there is no
close substitute for risky sexual behavior, such as monogamy or protected sexual activity,
for two reasons. First, in the context of the model there would be no implicit or explicit
cost for these substitute activities. Therefore, an agent can engage in these practices until
he reaches physical limits or a satiation point. Secondly, if safe sexual activity was a close
or perfect substitute, it would be extremely unlikely or impossible that an agent would risk
contracting HIV to engage in risky sexual activity. We know that people do make this choice
and take this risk, and the purpose of this paper is to examine how such decisions can be
altered by changing incentives. One way to alter the model to account for the possibility
that safe sexual practices are substitutable for risky sexual activity is to simply decrease γt
parameters. Setting these to zero implies safe sexual practices are perfect substitutes for
risky practices, so the agent engages in no risky behavior.
The additivity assumption implies there is no substitutability between consumption of
goods and sexual activity, so the agent's marginal utility for sexual activity cannot be en-
hanced or diminished with greater personal or family consumption. Put another way, the
agent's preferences for risky sexual activity are not related to his preferences for consump-
tion. Allow the utility function for personal and family consumption be given by the following
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function,
v(ct, ft) = log
([
α (ct + )
ν−1
ν + (1− α) (ft + )
ν−1
ν
] ν
ν−1
)
− log() (2)
where  is a small positive value close to zero that is put in the utility function to force
utility equal to zero when all consumption variables are equal to zero.3 This is convenient
as it is possible the agent may not be alive and therefore personal consumption may equal
zero. A natural log is taken of the CES aggregate so that the utility function still exhibits
diminishing marginal utility in the event the agent is not alive and the personal consumption
3The value of  is chosen very close to zero so as to not substantially disrupt the Inada condition that
imposes the limit of marginal utility as consumption approaches zero is equal to inﬁnity, which among
other conditions helps guarantee an interior solution. When  is small but positive, the marginal utility of
consumption at zero will be ﬁnite, but very large.
A Life Insurance Deterrent to Risky Behavior in Africa 6
is equal to zero (without the logarithm, when personal consumption is equal to zero the CES
aggregate simpliﬁes to a linear function of family consumption).
The parameter α governs the degree to which the agent selﬁshly prefers his own consump-
tion over his family's consumption. The parameter ν is the elasticity of substitution between
the agent's personal consumption and family's consumption. When ν ∈ (0, 1) personal con-
sumption and family consumption are complements; when ν ∈ (1,∞) they are substitutes. If
these were complements, an agent would care very little about what happened to his family's
consumption if he died. Personal consumption would be zero, and if family consumption is
a complement, increasing family consumption would have little to no impact on utility. If
an agent if fact does value a life insurance beneﬁt payable to his family should he die, then
personal and family consumption must be substitutes in utility. We focus strictly on this
case in the analysis that follows.
The utility function for the number of sexual partners is treated diﬀerently, as this type
of behavior is not similar to other types of consumption behavior. Typical consumption
goods are limited by income, and typical utility functions are unbounded and monotoni-
cally increasing. In the presence of income growth, budget constraints are eased, and the
optimal choice for consumption can grow indeﬁnitely as the economy grows. This is not a
phenomenon we see when it comes to the number of sexual partners one has. In countries
like the United States where prevalence of sexually transmitted disease is low and safe sex
practices are common, accumulating a large number of sexual partners can be done with lit-
tle explicit cost or opportunity cost, but most people (there are exceptions of course) choose
not to do so. In the presence of a monotonically increasing utility function, this is the type
of behavior we would expect.
Since we suppose agents have the ability to accumulate sexual partners but have a pref-
erence not to beyond some point, we follow Kremer (1996) and impose a utility function
that reaches a satiation point. There exists some ﬁnite number of sexual partners, m∗, such
that w′(m∗) = 0. The agent receives the highest utility possible from m∗ number of sexual
partners, even if it is feasible to obtain more. Not only is this an arguably reasonable as-
sumption, it is crucial in the context of our model to avoid situations in which agents decide
to let the number of risky sexual partners approach inﬁnity, driving the probability of dying
from AIDS to 100%, therefore optimally foregoing continued life, future income, and future
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consumption if favor of driving present utility to inﬁnity from having an arbitrarily large
number of risky sexual partners.
Let the utility function for the number of risky sexual partners be given by,
w(mt) = log
[
− (mt −m∗)2 + (m∗)2 + 
]
− log() (3)
The quadratic component of utility function delivers the satiation point.4 To give the utility
function for sexual partners less thanm∗ similar behavior as utility function for the consump-
tion aggregate, the natural log is taken.5 Similarly to the utility function for consumption, a
very small value, , is added to and subtracted from the utility function to force the utility
to equal zero when the number of sexual partners is zero, which will happen in the event the
agent is not alive.
The agent derives utility according to equations (1), (2), and (3) for up to four periods
with some exceptions. In the event the agent is not alive in periods 2, 3, or 4, he cannot
enjoy personal consumption (ct = 0) or risky sexual activity (mt = 0). Even though the
agent is not alive, he does still care about the well being of his family, so an optimal choice
for ft may still be positive. We also assume the agent does not derive utility from sexual
activity in periods 3 and 4, so we impose that γ3 = γ4 = 0 and force m3 = m4 = 0. This
change in preferences may be interpreted as resulting from a change in values or maturity,
or a change in health that comes with age. Data for HIV prevalence in sub-Saharan Africa
for individuals over the age of 49 (agents in period 3 and 4) is not typically available. With
the assumption these parameters are equal to zero, agents living in period 3 and 4 will have
no risky sexual activity, and their HIV prevalence rates will equal zero. We see in the next
section this leads to predictions in the model for the overall HIV prevalence among all adult
4While the quadratic form is assumed for simplicity, a more complicated reduced form utility function
with a satiation point can be derived from microfoundations with a strictly increasing monotonic utility
function for leisure and risky sexual activity, a time constraint, and a production function that maps time
spent on searching for partners to the number of partners one obtains. Such a modeling strategy is not
employed as the beneﬁt is a microfounded satiation point (this does not change the dynamics of model), but
the costs include complicating the optimization problem, complicating the notation, and requiring additional
parameters to be calibrated which will yield predictions for the trade-oﬀ between leisure time and the number
of sexual partners one chooses - something which is not of interest in this paper.
5Without the log, the utility function is quadratic and the marginal utility of sexual partners is ﬁnite
when the number of sexual partners is equal to zero. The log of the quadratic function is taken again to
impose the Inada condition that helps guarantee an interior solution: the marginal utility of the number of
sexual partners approach inﬁnity as the number of partners approaches zero.
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males to be lower, but only slightly lower, than is reported in the data. This assumption
is also convenient for our purposes because the maximum amount of time an agent can live
is four periods, so in the context of the model there would be no negative consequences to
risky sexual behavior in the ﬁnal period.
The expected utility function over all four periods is given by,
U = u(c1, f1,m1) + βδpi(m1)u(c2, f2,m2) + β [1− δpi(m1)]u(0, f2, 0)
+β2δ2pi(m1)pi(m2)u(c3, f3, 0) + β
2
[
1− δ2pi(m1)pi(m2)
]
u(0, f3, 0)
+β3δ3pi(m1)pi(m2)u(c4, f4, 0) + β
2
[
1− δ3pi(m1)pi(m2)
]
u(0, f4, 0)
(4)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a time discount parameter and the function u(ct, ft,mt) is given in
equation (1). The ﬁrst term in the utility function is the utility gained from the ﬁrst period
from personal consumption, family consumption, and risky sexual activity. The next two
terms compose the expression for the expected utility in period 2. The ﬁrst of these is the
product of the probability the agent is alive in the second period and the utility earned if the
agent is alive. To be alive, the agent must have not died from AIDS (probability given by
pi(m1)) and must not have died from exogenous factors (probability given by δ). The second
of these terms is the utility if the agent is not alive in period 2. Personal consumption and
risky sexual activity variables are forced to zero, but the agent nonetheless derives utility
from his family's consumption, so f2 and the utility derived from f2 can be positive. The
remaining terms mirror the ones already mentioned. The third and fourth lines in equation
(4) are the expected utility in periods 3 and 4, respectively, which are weighted averages of
utility derived from personal and family consumption if the agent is alive and utility derived
from only family consumption if the agent is dead. Notice, even if the agent is alive in
periods 3 or 4, risky sexual activity is set to zero as discussed above.
2.2 Budget Constraint
The agent spends money on consumption goods for himself and his family and receives a
ﬁxed income in ﬁrst period, and again in the second and third periods if the agent is still
alive. If the agent is alive in the fourth period he is retired and does not earn any income.
We examine the consequences of a life insurance beneﬁt in the event the agent dies before
A Life Insurance Deterrent to Risky Behavior in Africa 9
periods 2, 3, or 4, but is not HIV positive at the time. If the agent dies just before period t
from exogenous causes (probability given by 1 − δ), but is HIV negative (probability given
by pi(mt−1), he gets life insurance beneﬁts, bt ≥ 0, added to his income for the period
immediately following his death.
We make the convenient, but perhaps somewhat unrealistic assumption, that perfect
asset markets exist so that the expected present value of expenditures over four periods
(whether the agent is alive or not) must equal the expected present value of incomes during
the same time period. The four-period present value expected budget constraint is given by,
c1 + δpi(m1)
c2
1 + r
+ δ2pi(m1)pi(m2)
c3
(1 + r)2
+ δ3pi(m1)pi(m2)
c4
(1 + r)3
+f1 +
f2
1 + r
+
f3
(1 + r)2
+
f4
(1 + r)3
= w1 + δpi(m1)
w2
1 + r
+ δ2pi(m1)pi(m2)
w3
(1 + r)2
+(1− δ)pi(m1) b2
1 + r
+ δ(1− δ)pi(m1)pi(m2) b3
(1 + r)2
+ δ2(1− δ)pi(m1)pi(m2) b4
(1 + r)3
,
(5)
where r is the real interest rate for a 15 year time period, and wt is the exogenous real
wage income for period t. Consumption goods ct and ft are thought to be the same type
of consumption good and therefore have the same price, which is normalized to 1. The ﬁrst
line of the budget constraint is the expected present value of personal consumption streams,
where each term is weighted by the probability the agent is still alive. The second line is the
present value of family consumption streams, which are consumed with certainty whether
the agent is alive or not. The third line is the present value of wage income streams where
again each term weighted by the probability the agent is alive to receive the income. The
ﬁnal line is the expected present value of life insurance beneﬁts. Note that even though
each life insurance beneﬁt appears in the expected value, at most only one of these life
insurance beneﬁts will actually be paid out. Each life insurance beneﬁt, bt is weighted by
the probability the agent lived up through period t− 1, died from exogenous factors before
period t begins, and did not contract HIV before dying.
A Life Insurance Deterrent to Risky Behavior in Africa 10
2.3 HIV Prevalence
The functional form for pi(mt), the probability an agent does not contract HIV during period
t for a given number of risky sexual partners, mt, follows the speciﬁcation of HIV incidence
suggested by Oster (2005). Let h ∈ (0, 1) denote the HIV prevalence among potential
sexual partners and τ ∈ (0, 1) denote the probability that a sexual partner that happens to
have HIV actually transmits the disease during the course of a relationship (female-to-male
transmission rate). For a single sexual partner, the probability of not contracting HIV is
(1− hτ). Due to the lack of sophisticated medical services available in sub-Saharan Africa,
almost everyone that contracts HIV dies of AIDS within 15 years. Therefore, if an agent
has mt sexual partners over period t, the probability of not not dying from AIDS before the
next 15 year period is equal to,
pi(mt) = (1− ht)mt (6)
The HIV prevalence among males age t (for t = 1, 2) is then approximately equal to 1−pi(mt).
The HIV prevalence for the population of all adult males over the age of 20 is a weighed
average of (1− pi(m1)) and (1− pi(m2)), weighted by their respective population sizes. The
weights for each age group is the number males still alive in a given age group expressed as
a percentage of the total men alive in all age groups. Using this expression for the weights,
the overall HIV prevalence among all adult males is given by,
hmen =
[1− pi(m1)] + pi(m1)δ [1− pi(m2)]
1 + pi(m1)δ + pi(m1)pi(m2)δ2 + pi(m1)pi(m2)δ3
, (7)
where the size of the population of men in the ﬁrst age group is normalized to 1. In the
next section we use equations (6) and (7) when examining how factors that inﬂuence risky
behavior impact HIV prevalence.
One shortcoming of the model is the assumption that h is ﬁxed. If a change in income, life
expectancy, or government policy were successful at deterring risky behavior (i.e. decreasing
utility maximizing choices for mt), equations (6) and (7) predict the HIV prevalence among
adult men will fall. We would expect as a consequence that the HIV prevalence among
women would fall in turn, as women would be less likely to contract the disease from men.
Putting dynamics like this into the model introduces a simultaneity problem that makes
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the utility maximization problem intractable, even when using numerical methods. The
optimal choice for the number of sexual partners in a given period depends on h. The HIV
prevalence rate among men of each age group depends on this number of partners. Finally,
the HIV prevalence rate among women, h, would depend on the HIV prevalence rate among
men. For simplicity, instead of trying to evaluate a model with this level of complexity, the
HIV prevalence rate of women is held constant, and calibrated to values that match data in
sub-Saharan Africa.6
2.4 Optimal Behavior
Agents choose personal consumption plans, c1, c2, c3, and c4; family consumption plans, f1,
f2, f3, and f4; and the number of sexual partners in the ﬁrst and second periods of life,
m1 and m2; to maximize the expected four-period expected utility function, equation (4),
subject to the four-period present value expected budget constraint, equation (5), and the
probability of not contracting HIV, equation (6). There is no closed form solution of the
model, so the solution is obtained numerically in the next section for a given set of values
for the parameters. The remainder of this paper focuses primarily on the utility maximizing
choices for m1 and m2 and the HIV prevalence rates that result.
2.5 Calibrations
A baseline set of parameter values is given in Table 1. Calibrations for life expectancy,
income, HIV prevalence of women, and preference parameters for sexual activity are based
on data for Zambia given in Table 2. The prevalence for HIV prevalence among potential
female sexual partners, h, is set equal to 0.161, which is the proportion of all women in
Zambia with HIV according to the 2007 Demographic Health Surveys. The probability of
surviving risk of a non-AIDS death from one period to the next is set to δ = 0.556 to reﬂect
a non-AIDS life expectancy of 53 years, the estimate reported in 2008 by US Census Bureau
- HIV/AIDS Surveillance.7 Real GDP per capita in Zambia in 2007 was $374 (measured
6Oster (2005) accounts for this complexity by simulating a model with shorter time periods, in which the
HIV prevalence rates in the current period for each gender depend on the past period's HIV prevalence rates
(predetermined) for the opposite gender.
7With certainty the agent lives through period 1 which ends just before age 35. Given the agent does
not die from AIDS, agent lives through each consecutive 15 period with probability δ. The non-AIDS life
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in constant year 2000 U.S. dollars) according to the World Bank 2007 World Development
Indicators. The incomes wt for t = 1, 2, 3, in the model represent the total household income,
instead of the average per-person income, so per-capita income needs to be converted to per-
household income. Unable to ﬁnd data on average household size in Zambia, we assume
households are made up of about 4 people, so we multiply per-capita real GDP by 4 to get
average annual household income. We multiply again by 15 to get household income over a
15 year period, so w1 = w2 = w3 = 22, 440.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
A number of studies have attempted to estimate the probability an HIV infected female
transmits the disease to a male during the course of a relationship with estimates ranging
from 7.1% to 27.3% (Oster [2009]). For this paper we pick the value of 15% (τ = 0.15)
and examine how behavior changes as this parameter changes. The values of the ﬁfteen
year discount rate, β, and ﬁfteen year interest rate, r, reﬂect an annual real interest rate of
approximately 4%.
The remaining parameters to calibrate concern the utility function parameters for pref-
erences for personal and family consumption and preferences for risky sexual activity. We
set the preference for personal consumption versus family consumption to α = 0.5, and
the elasticity of substitution between these two types of consumption to ν = 1.0. Without
any data to help calibrate these parameters we conduct sensitivity analysis in the following
sections to learn how these parameters inﬂuence risky behavior and how they inﬂuence the
deterrence eﬀect of a life insurance beneﬁt. The satiation point for sexual activity is set to
m∗ = 50, which is simply chosen to be far away from optimal values of mt for reasonable
calibrations of the other parameters so as to have a negligible inﬂuence on the dynamics
of the model. Finally, the preference parameters for sexual partners, γ1 and γ2 are chosen
using a moment matching method. For given calibrations of γ1 and γ2, and for all other
parameter calibrations given in Table 1, the utility maximization problem is solved, optimal
solutions for m1 and m2 are obtained, and the resulting HIV prevalence rates for age groups
expectancy, L, and the probability of dying, δ, are related by the equation, L = 35 + δ15 + δ215 + δ315.
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1 and 2 are calculated using equation (6). We conduct a search for values for γ1 and γ2
that lead to model predicted prevalence rates that match the prevalence data in Table 2.
The prevalence data is broken down into smaller ﬁve-year age groups, so the HIV prevalence
rates for the ﬁrst three ﬁve-year age groups are averaged together to get an estimate for the
HIV prevalence for ages 20-34, and the remaining three ﬁve-year age groups are averaged
together to get an estimate for the HIV prevalence for ages 35-49. The moment matching
exercise results in preference parameters γ1 = 0.509 and γ2 = 0.492.
3 Dynamics of Risky Behavior
In this section we examine how decisions for risky sexual behavior can be altered by changing
incentives, speciﬁcally focusing on the deterrence eﬀect of a life insurance beneﬁt payout.
Before addressing this issue, however, we ﬁrst examine how optimal choices for risky behavior
and the resulting HIV prevalence rates depend on parameter calibrations, especially for cali-
brations that do not have a one-to-one matching with an empirical observation. Secondly we
examine how decisions for risky behavior depends on income and life expectancy. One reason
a man in sub-Saharan Africa engages in excessive amounts of risky behavior in Africa is that
he has relatively less cost in doing so than for a typical person in a developed country like
the United States. The cost is the possibility of dying from AIDS and foregoing future con-
sumption and future income. Since income and life expectancy are both low in sub-Saharan
Africa, we would expect a high amount of risky sexual activity. We demonstrate in this
section the model does deliver this prediction. Finally, we show how a life insurance beneﬁt
provided by a government can mimic the deterrence eﬀect of driving up life expectancy and
income, a far less feasible government action. We show how the deterrence eﬀects depend on
parameter calibrations, and conclude with predictions for the reduction in HIV prevalence
for a handful of sub-Saharan African countries that can be made possible from an arguably
feasible, cost-eﬀective, life insurance beneﬁt.
3.1 Parameter Sensitivity
The greatest source of parameter uncertainty concerns the parameters in the utility function.
Figure 1 illustrates the sensitivity to the preference parameters of the utility maximizing
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choice for the number of sexual partners for the ﬁrst two age groups (left column), and the
resulting HIV prevalence rates (right column) predicted by equation (6). The solid lines
illustrate the impact on the ﬁrst age group (ages 20-34) and the dashed lines illustrate the
impact on the second age group (ages 35-49). For each plot, all parameters except the
parameter of interest are held ﬁxed to the calibrations given in Table 1. The ﬁrst two rows
show the sensitivity to the relative preference for risky sexual activity, γt over the range
(0, 3). As expected, the higher is the preference for sexual partners in the ﬁrst period, the
higher is the number of sexual partners one will have in the ﬁrst period and the higher will
be the HIV prevalence among the young population (ages 20-34). Notice, this parameter
has almost no eﬀect on the choice for the number of sexual partners for the second period.
The second row of graphs in Figure 1 show how optimal choices for sexual activity depend
on period 2. Again, the number of sexual partners and therefore the HIV prevalence among
the middle age group increases as the preference parameter increases. Unlike with the ﬁrst
parameter, the choice for the number of sexual partners in the ﬁrst period does depend on
the second period parameter. As γ2 increases the number of sexual partners in the ﬁrst
period decreases. As the utility from sexual partners in the second period increases, there
is a larger opportunity cost of risky sexual behavior in the ﬁrst period so agents choose to
have fewer sexual partners in the ﬁrst period.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The bottom two rows of Figure 1 illustrate how risky sexual activity depends on the pref-
erence parameters for family consumption versus personal consumption. The third row of
graphs show that as α, the relative value of personal consumption versus family consumption,
increases, the optimal number of sexual partners decreases. As this parameter increases, an
agent values relatively highly his own consumption, and cares relatively little about his fam-
ily's consumption. Therefore, the utility opportunity cost of risky sexual activity increases
as α increases, and the optimal choice for the number of sexual partners decreases along with
HIV prevalence rates. The ﬁnal row illustrates the role the elasticity of substitution, ν, plays.
As this parameter increases, family consumption and personal consumption become more
substitutable in utility. The utility opportunity cost of risky sexual activity decreases as
family consumption becomes a suitable substitution for personal consumption in the event
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the agent contracts HIV and dies. The optimal choice for the number of sexual partners
increases very quickly as the elasticity of substitution increases, indicating small diﬀerences
in the elasticity of substitution can have dramatic eﬀects on risky behavior.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 illustrates the impact the sexual transmission parameters, h and τ , have on the
optimal choices for sexual partners. Again, for each ﬁgure all the parameters are kept at their
calibrated values given in Table 1 except the parameter of interest. As the probability that
a partner has HIV (h) increases, or as the probability that HIV is transmitted from female
to male during the course of a relationship (τ) increases, the optimal choice for the number
of sexual partners decreases, but the probability that a male transmits HIV increases.
3.2 Deterrence Eﬀects
Life expectancy and income are key parameters that may deter risky behavior and that
distinguish people in lesser developed countries from highly developed countries. As reported
in Table 2, according to the U.S. Census Bureau HIV/AIDS Surveillance of 2008, the non-
AIDS life expectancy in Zambia is only 53 years. This is how old adults may expect to
live when not engaging in risky risky behavior. Given a person might live for 10 years after
contracting HIV before dying from AIDS, one may determine there is little consequence of
contracting HIV in their adulthood. Moreover, annual real GDP per capita in Zambia in 2007
was only $374 (constant year 2000 U.S. dollars), so there would also be little income lost for
a man's family if he died from AIDS. The top two rows of Figure 3 show the optimal number
of risky sexual partners and resulting HIV prevalence rates for various levels of income (ﬁrst
row) and life expectancy (second row). Again, except for the parameter illustrated in the
ﬁgure, all other parameters are set to the values in Table 1. The values for income range
from nearly $0 (extremely impoverished) to $100,000 (more typical of a developed economy)
per family four. The number of sexual partners and HIV prevalence rates decrease with
higher levels of income, but surprisingly, the change is extremely small. The reduction in
risky sexual activity for the youngest age group (ages 20-34) is nearly zero and the predicted
HIV prevalence rate for age group 20-34 remains approximately 11%, regardless of the level
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of income. The reduction in risky sexual activity is larger for the older age group (ages
35-49); increasing income reduces HIV prevalence rates from about 22% to about 19%.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
It may seem counter intuitive that the youngest age group should have the smallest
deterrence eﬀect deriving from increases in income, as the beneﬁt is the largest for the age
group with the most number of years possible to earn this additional income. The reason for
this is that the youngest age group already decides to engage in less risky behavior than the
older age group. There is a larger opportunity cost for risky sexual activity in the youngest
age group; contracting HIV results in more years of life foregone, and therefore more income
foregone and more consumption foregone relative to those who are in the next oldest age
group. With relatively low levels of risky sexual activity, the marginal utility is high, and
the deterrence eﬀect of increases in income is small.
The second row of graphs in Figure 3 shows the impact non-AIDS life expectancy has
on the optimal number of sexual partners and HIV prevalence rates that result for life
expectancies ranging from 35 years to 80 years. The graphs show if life expectancy were to
decrease from 53 (current situation in Zambia) to 35, the number of sexual partners reaches
its satiation point and HIV prevalence rates become very high. More interestingly, as life
expectancy increases from 53 to 80, the HIV prevalence rate for age group 35-49 drops from
about 22% to 10% (approximately a 55% decline in the number of men in this group with
HIV), and for age group 20-34 it drops from 11% to about 7% (approximately a 36% decline
in the number of men in this group with HIV).
One may expect the reason an increase in income has such a small impact on the decision
to engage in risky behavior is that the low life expectancy eliminates some of the opportunity
to earn the extra income and spend the extra income on personal consumption. Figure 4
presents a three dimensional illustration of the interaction of increasing income and increasing
life expectancy. With the exception of the income and life expectancy parameters, all other
parameters are held to the calibrations given in Table 1. The vertical axis measures the
overall HIV prevalence rate for all men in all age groups, which uses equation (7) to average
over each age group. The base of the ﬁgure contains contour lines and shading to help
illustrate the height of the ﬁgure. The lighter is the shading at a particular point, the taller
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is the ﬁgure at that point. Life expectancy increases from 53 to 80 years moving left to
right along the front axis and annual real income per-capita increases from $374 to $100,000
moving from front to back along the right-hand axis.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The ﬁgure has a similar slope from left to right in the front (low income) versus the
back (high income), indicating there is relatively little interaction between income and life
expectancy as expected. However, the results conﬁrm that moving an under-developed coun-
try like Zambia away from the situation they are in, to a situation more like a developed
economy that has a high life expectancy and high income, can result in a reduction of HIV
prevalence among adult males from 11.9% to almost 3%, which is almost a 75% reduction
in the number of males with HIV. Note, this result assumes the parameter for HIV preva-
lence rate among women, h, remains at the calibrated value of 16.1%. In reality, as time
progresses and the HIV prevalence rate among men falls, not as many women will contract
HIV. Women's prevalence rates will fall which will have a reinforcing feedback on the HIV
prevalence rate among men, as previously illustrated in the ﬁrst row of graph in Figure 2.
As discussed earlier, adding this level of endogeneity makes the model intractable. In reality,
the combined deterrence eﬀect of increases in income and life expectancy can be even larger
in the long run than predicted in this model where h is ﬁxed.
Having shown that combining increases in life expectancy and income can strongly deter
risky sexual behavior and the spread of HIV, we turn to examine whether a life insurance
payout can replicate these eﬀects. The last row of graphs in Figure 3 shows the deterrence
eﬀect of a life insurance beneﬁt, payable at the time an agent dies, if death occurs before
the end of the ﬁnal period, and if the agent does not have HIV when he dies. The ﬁgure
illustrates the impact of life insurance beneﬁts ranging from $0 (baseline case) to $100,000.
The results largely mirror the eﬀect of an increase in income. There is a relatively small
deterrence eﬀect for people ages 35-49, and almost no deterrence eﬀect for the youngest age
group, ages 20-34. We shall see shortly, however, that the relatively small deterrence eﬀect
of life insurance depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution parameter, ν, and that it
is indeed possible for life insurance to much more eﬀectively reduce risky behavior and HIV
prevalence, depending on these parameters.
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[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect the elasticity of substitution plays on the deterrence eﬀect of
increases in income and life expectancy. Figure 5 illustrates the impact increasing income
has on HIV prevalence rates, for various values of the elasticity of substitution. Again, the
vertical axis measures the overall HIV prevalence rate among all adult males. Moving left to
right along the front axis annual per-capita income increases from $374 to $100,000. Moving
from front to back along the right-hand side axis, the elasticity of substitution increases from
1.0 (no substitutability) to 4.0 (personal and family consumption are highly substitutable
in utility). For each value of the elasticity of substitution, all parameters except γ1 and γ2
are held to the calibrated values in Table 1. For each value of ν considered, these preference
parameters for risky activity are re-calibrated using the moment matching exercise discussed
above. For each given value of ν, and for a baseline annual real income per capita of $374,
the values of γ1 and γ2 are chosen so that the model predicted HIV prevalence rates for age
groups 20-34 and 35-49 matches the data reported in Table 2, which results in the model
predicting an overall HIV prevalence among adult males of 11.9%.8
The small deterrence eﬀect of an increase in income seen earlier is reﬂected in the front-
most downward sloping part of Figure 5. As the elasticity of substitution between personal
and family consumption increases, the deterrence eﬀect quickly and completely disappears. If
personal consumption and family consumption are substitutable in utility, the utility cost to
engaging in risky sexual behavior disappears. An agent can increase current levels of utility
by increasing engagement in risky behavior, at the cost of foregoing future income and future
personal consumption if the agent dies of HIV. However, there is little loss of utility deriving
from losses of personal consumption, since an increase in family consumption after the agent
dies provides a suitable substitute.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
8Note this HIV prevalence rate is slightly below the data on HIV prevalence rate among all males in
Zambia of 12.3%, which is reported in Table 2. This is because the model assumes the older two age groups,
50-64 and 65-79, do not engage in any risky sexual behavior, and therefore have HIV prevalence rates equal
to zero. Although this is an unrealistic assumption, the fact the model predicted HIV prevalence rate of
11.9% is not very diﬀerent than the rate 12.3% suggested in the data, suggests there is relatively little harm
in this assumption.
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Figure 6 illustrates the deterrence eﬀect of increasing life expectancy for various levels of
the elasticity of substitution. Again, for each value of ν considered, the calibrations for γ1
and γ2 are adjusted so that predicted HIV prevalence rates for a baseline life expectancy of
53 match the data reported in Table 2. The results show the greatest deterrence eﬀect occurs
when ν is smallest, and the deterrence eﬀect decreases slightly as the elasticity increases.
As personal and family consumption become more substitutable, again the utility cost of
losing of years of life can be mediated by substituting family consumption for personal
consumption. Nonetheless, over a large range for the elasticity, the deterrence eﬀect of
increasing life expectancy is still rather substantial.
[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 7 illustrates how the impact of a government-provided life insurance beneﬁt can
depend crucially on the elasticity of substitution. Again, values for γ1 and γ2 are re-calibrated
for each value of ν considered. The relatively moderate deterrence eﬀect of a life insurance
beneﬁt seen before is a special case when personal and family consumption are not sub-
stitutable (ν = 1). Moving from front to back, as the elasticity of substitution increases
moderately, the graph quickly drops oﬀ, indicating the deterrence eﬀect gets larger as per-
sonal and family consumption become more substitutable. Since a life insurance beneﬁt
can only be used for family consumption once the agent has died, the life insurance beneﬁt
can replicate the eﬀects of a greater life expectancy (in which personal consumption can be
enjoyed when the agent is alive) if personal consumption and family consumption are substi-
tutable in utility. In the best scenario illustrated in the ﬁgure, when ν = 4.0 a $100,000 life
insurance beneﬁt can reduce risky behavior so that the HIV prevalence rate among all adult
men drops from 11.9% to about 6%, which is almost a 50% reduction in the number of men
with HIV. The reason the deterrence eﬀect is not quite as large as the eﬀect of increasing
both life expectancy and real per-capita income to $100,000 (this eﬀect previously illustrated
in Figure 4) is that the income is paid out for three periods, but the life insurance beneﬁt is
a one-time payment made upon the agent's death.
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4 Practical Implementation
The previous section provided evidence that the HIV epidemic in Africa may simply be a
side-eﬀect of an under-developed economy epidemic. We showed that risky behavior and
HIV prevalence rates can be brought down by simply increasing life expectancy and income
to levels common in highly developed countries. Of course, this very desirable policy is only
simple to do with the mathematical model, and impossible in practice. We then examined
a next best policy of a government provided life insurance beneﬁt paid out if an agent dies
before age 80 and does not have HIV. Given personal and family consumption are substi-
tutable in utility, we demonstrated this can mimic the impact of increasing life expectancy
and income. While it is conceptually feasible to pay out life insurance beneﬁts, the values
considered reached $100,000 per family, a policy quite infeasible for a country whose annual
real GDP per person is only $374. The purpose of considering such policies was to deter-
mine whether a life insurance program can deter risky behavior and reduce HIV prevalence
in sub-Saharan Africa in a similar manner as increasing income and life expectancy to levels
typical of a developed country. Our conditional answer to this question is yes. We now
examine how the life insurance program can be made more cost eﬀective, and determine the
deterrence eﬀect for aﬀordable programs.
4.1 Cost-Eﬀective Policy
The life insurance beneﬁt plans considered in the previous section were paid out in the event
death occurred anytime before the fourth period (ages 35-79). The deterrence eﬀect diﬀers
for life insurance beneﬁts paid out for diﬀerent periods, so it may be more cost eﬀective to
make life insurance beneﬁt payouts only for deaths occurring at speciﬁc ages. For example,
the life insurance beneﬁt paid out if an agent dies between periods 3 and 4 (age 65) has a
very small deterrence eﬀect. Under no life insurance, if the agent dies he loses utility from
only one period of personal consumption and there is no loss of income as the agent would
be retired. Insuring against the possibility the agent dies between periods 1 and 2 (age 35)
also has very little deterrence. We saw evidence in the previous section that life insurance
has very little impact on risky behavior for the youngest age group because their levels of
risky sexual activity are already relatively low and therefore the marginal utility from this
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action is relatively high. A life insurance beneﬁt paid out if death occurs after the ﬁrst period
would similarly have a small deterrence eﬀect.
A life insurance deterrent that is also cost eﬀective may be one that only pays a beneﬁt if
death occurs immediately following period 2. Figure 8 illustrates the deterrence eﬀect of life
insurance beneﬁts between $0 and $20,000, when beneﬁts are only paid out if deaths occur
at certain times. We saw in the previous section that the deterrence eﬀect was particularly
weak when personal and family consumption are not substitutable (ν = 1). To illustrate a
more optimistic scenario, the results in Figure 8 use ν = 2.0, and γ1 and γ2 are re-calibrated
accordingly; all other parameters remain equal to the values reported in Table 1. The top
left graph shows the baseline, best-case scenario when life insurance is paid out for any death
which is uncertain (death occurring after periods 1, 2, or 3). As the life insurance beneﬁt
increases from $0 to $20,000, the HIV prevalence rate for all men decreases from 11.9% to
9.4%, which is a 20.3% reduction in the number of adult males with HIV. This graph also
illustrates that most of this decrease comes from a decrease in risky behavior among the age
group 35-49. HIV prevalence rate among this group decreases from 21.7% to 15.9%. The
HIV prevalence rate for the youngest age group decreases only slightly from 11.9% to 10%.
[INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]
The top-right graph in Figure 8 shows the deterrence eﬀect when life insurance is only
paid if death follows immediately after periods 2 and 3 (i.e. the possibility of a life insurance
payout if death occurs at age 35 is ruled out). The graph shows the deterrence eﬀect for
men ages 25-34 almost completely disappears, but the deterrence eﬀect on men ages 35-49
is even larger than the baseline case. For the older age group, HIV prevalence drops from
21.7% to 14.2%. The greater deterrence eﬀect on the older age group leads to a decrease in
HIV prevalence among all adult males from 11.9% to 9.5%, which is a 19.9% reduction in
the number of men with HIV. This is very near to the deterrence eﬀect if life insurance is
also paid out after period 1 (top-left graph), indicating it is more cost eﬀective to limit life
insurance payouts to those who live past age 35.
The bottom graphs in Figure 8 illustrate the deterrence eﬀect if life insurance is paid
out only if death follows period 3 (bottom-left) and only if death follows period 2 (bottom-
right). In both cases, the deterrence eﬀect on the youngest age group is nearly zero. If life
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insurance is only paid out if death immediately follows period 3 (age 65), the deterrence
eﬀect for men ages 35-49 drops oﬀ signiﬁcantly. This is expected. For a man who is between
35-49, even if he refrains from risky behavior and successfully avoids contracting HIV, it is
possible to die at age 50 (immediately following period 2) and never be able to receive the
life insurance beneﬁt. The deterrence eﬀect if life insurance is paid out only if death follows
period 2 has very similar deterrence eﬀects as the more largely available life insurance plans
considered in the top two graphs. Again, the deterrence eﬀect for males ages 35-49 is quite
large, leading to a reduction of HIV prevalence among all men from 11.9% to 9.9%, which
is a 16.6% reduction in the number of men with HIV.
Table 3 summarizes the deterrence eﬀect for a $20,000 policy when life insurance beneﬁt
payouts are limited to deaths only at certain ages, and displays the per-capita annual cost
to the government for providing the life insurance policy. The average cost for covering an
adult age t against the possibility of dying at the end of age t is given by,
ct = $20, 000(1− δ)pi(mt),
for t = 1, 2, 3, where pi(mt) is the probability the adult does not contract HIV, given in
equation (6), and (1−δ) is the probability the agent dies from exogenous causes. To consider
cost for policies paid out only for deaths occurring at speciﬁed ages, let a policy be denoted
by the set P ⊆ {1, 2, 3}. If the set P contains time t, this implies the policy does pay life
insurance beneﬁts for a non-HIV related death occurring immediately following period t. Let
cP denote the annual, per-capita, cost of policy P . This is computed by,
cP =
(
1
4
)(
1
15
)
1{1∈P}c1 + 1{2∈P}δpi(m1)c2 + 1{3∈P}δ2pi(m1)pi(m2)c3
1 + δpi(m1) + δ
2pi(m1)pi(m2) + δ
3pi(m1)pi(m2)
,
where 1{t∈P} is an indicator function that is equal to 1 when t ∈ P and 0 otherwise. The
coeﬃcient preceding ct in each term in combination with the denominator is used to weight
each ct by the fraction of the adult male population that is age t. Finally, the cost is divided
by 4 to put in per-capita terms instead of per-family terms, and is again divided by 15 to
put in annual terms, since each period is 15 years.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
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The results in Table 3 conﬁrm that the most cost-eﬀective life insurance policies are
those with payouts for deaths that occur only immediately following periods 2 and 3, which
has an annual cost of $56.41 per person; and the policy that only pays out only for death
immediately following period 2, which has an annual cost per-capita cost of $38.41.
4.2 Application to sub-Saharan Africa
The primary focus of this paper is on Zambia, one of the poorest sub-Saharan African
countries, a country with very low life expectancy, and one that has been particularly hit
hard by the HIV epidemic. As we close our discussion, we brieﬂy consider the deterrence
eﬀects and costs associated of life insurance policies in similar sub-Saharan countries. Tables
4 and 5 show data and calibrations, respectively, for Zambia and four other sub-Saharan
countries: Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Rwanda. These countries similarly have low life
expectancies and low GDP per capita, but the HIV prevalence rates among adult men and
women are not nearly as high as for Zambia. The calibrations for female-to-male transmission
rate, τ , and preference for personal consumption, α, are the same as considered for Zambia
above. The value for the elasticity of substitution for personal versus family consumption
is ν = 2.0, a non-extreme value found in the previous section that nonetheless allows life
insurance to deter risky behavior. The remaining parameters are calibrated to match the
data as was done for Zambia above.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 9 illustrates the deterrence eﬀect of a life insurance beneﬁt ranging from $0 to
$20,000, payable only if a non-HIV related death occurs immediately following period 2. For
all countries, the deterrence eﬀect is largest for the age group 35-49. Table 6 summarizes the
deterrence eﬀects and costs for each country. The top three rows show the model-predicted
HIV prevalence rates for adult men in each country under no life insurance. The results for
ages 20-34 and 35-49 match the averages from these age groups in the data by design, as
these are the moment matching conditions used to calibrate γ1 and γ2. The model predicted
values for all males falls only slightly short of the data, because, as discussed above, the
A Life Insurance Deterrent to Risky Behavior in Africa 24
model assumes men over the age 50 do not engage in risky behavior. The next three rows
report the model-predicted HIV prevalence rates in the presence of a $20,000 life insurance
policy, as is illustrated graphically in Figure 9. The annual costs per person range from
$19.81 for Kenya to $38.40 for Zambia. The costs and deterrence eﬀects are signiﬁcantly
lower for Kenya because the life expectancy in this country is 64 years, signiﬁcantly above
the other countries. Since people in Kenya expect to live past 50 with a greater probability,
the chances of receiving the life insurance beneﬁt is lower, and therefore the deterrence eﬀect
is lower. Similarly, fewer life insurance beneﬁts need to be paid out, so the costs are lower.
[INSERT FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
The results for Kenya illustrate how the life insurance program may substitute for longer
life expectancy while a country improves its sanitary conditions, its health care resources
and its accessibility to health care. As a country's life expectancy improves, risky behavior
decreases which replaces some of the deterrence eﬀects of the life insurance program, but
the life insurance payouts become less common and so the program becomes less costly. As
developing countries make positive steps towards improving health and continuing economic
growth, the AIDS epidemic will slow down as utility maximizing people engage in less risky
behavior, and the deterrence eﬀects and the ﬁnancial burden of the life insurance policy
will naturally phase out. In the mean time, we have demonstrated that life insurance can
feasibly reduce risky behavior and the spread of HIV/AIDS in impoverished sub-Saharan
African countries.
5 Conclusion
Low levels of income and low life expectancy leads to low opportunity cost for risky sexual
behavior. We show using utility maximizing model that focuses on adult males with de-
pendents and is calibrated for Zambia that increasing income and life expectancy to levels
common in highly developed countries can lead to a signiﬁcant decrease in risky behavior and
the spread of HIV/AIDS. This paper provides a theoretical foundation suggesting the root of
the HIV/AIDS problem is the under-developed economy. We next show that a government
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provided life insurance beneﬁt, payable for non-HIV related deaths, can similarly deter adult
males from engaging in risky sexual behavior. At the worst case scenario, when personal and
family consumption are not substitutable, the life insurance program mimics the relatively
mild deterrence eﬀects deriving from increasing income. In the best case scenario, personal
and family consumption are highly substitutable, and the life insurance program mimics
the larger deterrence eﬀect of increasing life expectancy. With the life insurance payout,
the increase in family consumption leads to a signiﬁcant increase in the utility even though
personal consumption is zero, given the high degree of substitutability. We furthermore
showed that as long as the elasticity of substitution is larger than 2.0, life insurance can be
a strong deterrent. Finally, we examined scenarios in which the policy can be implemented
aﬀordably and cost eﬀectively. Life insurance beneﬁts as large as $20,000 (real U.S. dollars,
base year 2000) can have signiﬁcant deterrence eﬀects and have an annual per-capita cost to
the government less than $40.
The deterrence eﬀects deriving from a life insurance policy may be even greater than
the results in this paper suggest, as the model is relatively simple to keep the question
focused and the analysis tractable. One issue already suggested is the HIV prevalence rate
among potential sexual partners is assumed to remain constant, and is set equal to the
HIV prevalence rate among women suggested in the data. In reality, if men decreased their
risky sexual activity, the HIV prevalence rate among women would also fall over time, and
the lower prevalence rate among women would have a positive feedback on men, further
decreasing the HIV prevalence rates for men.
Actual implementation of this life insurance policy may also cause testing for HIV and
other sexually transmitted diseases (STD) to become more common. If increased testing can
improve education regarding STDs and change cultural norms concerning safe sex practices,
this can further decrease HIV prevalence. While this is not explicitly addressed in the model,
one can think of an increase in the preference for safe sex versus risky sexual behavior as a
fall in the γ preference parameters, which we demonstrated leads to decreases in risky sexual
behavior and HIV prevalence. Finally, a life insurance beneﬁt is a deterrence policy that
is far reaching. It does not focus on speciﬁc localities or focus strictly on commercial sex
workers. It is a policy that inﬂuences the decisions of all adults that care about the welfare
of their loved ones in the event they die. To maintain a tractable model, this paper focused
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on adult males speciﬁcally, but in practice, a life insurance policy could be made available
to anyone who is a head of household, that is a primary income earner for a family with
dependents.
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Table 1: Baseline Parameter Calibrations for Zambia
Parameter Description Value
γ1 Preference of sexual partners for ages 20-34
1 0.509
γ2 Preference of sexual partners for ages 35-49
1 0.492
m∗ Maximum number of partners 50
h Probability sexual partner has HIV2 0.161
δ Prob. surviving non-AIDS death risk3 0.566
w Income for family of four, over 15 years 22,440
τ Female-to-Male HIV transmission rate 0.15
α Preference for personal consumption 0.5
ν Elasticity of personal/family substitution 1.0
Notes: This is a baseline set of calibrations used to generate the results that
follow. With the exception of τ , α, and ν, these parameters are chosen to match
the data reported in Table 2.
1 Calibrations for γ1 and γ2, the utility function parameters for how much sexual
activity is valued relative to consumption, are chosen so that the utility maxi-
mizing choice for the number of sexual partners leads to HIV prevalence rates
for each age group suggested by the data presented in Table 2. The calibrations
for these two parameters therefore depend on all the other calibrations given in
this table.
2 Calibration matches HIV prevalence among all women in Zambia given in Ta-
ble 2.
3 Calibration matches non-AIDS life expectancy in Zambia given in Table 2.
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Table 2: Observed Characteristics for Zambia
Gender / Age HIV Prevalence (%)1
Men 20-24 5.0
Men 25-29 11.5
Men 30-34 17.0
Men 35-39 22.5
Men 40-44 24.0
Men 45-50 18.5
All Men 12.3
All Women 16.1
Other Characteristics
Life Expectancy2 53
GDP per capita3 374
1Source: 2007 Demographic Health Surveys.
2Non-AIDS life expectancy from infancy in 2008.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau - HIV/AIDS Surveil-
lance 2008.
3Source: 2007 World Development Indicators,
World Bank.
Table 3: Response to HIV Prevalence to Availabilities for $20,000 Life Insurance Beneﬁt
Date of Death
New HIV
Prevalence (%)
Percentage
Reduction
Per-capita
Annual Cost
Following Periods 1, 2, or 3. 9.4 20.3 $132.90
Following Periods 2 or 3 9.5 19.9 $56.89
Following Period 2 9.9 16.6 $38.41
Following Period 3 11.1 6.5 $17.68
Notes: The ﬁrst column reports the predicted HIV prevalence among all adult males if a life insurance
beneﬁt of $20,000 is made available to those that die immediately following given periods and do
not have HIV. The initial HIV prevalence rate among all adult males predicted by the model is
11.9%. The second column reports the percentage drop in the number of men with HIV, which is
the percentage diﬀerence between the new HIV prevalence rate reported in the ﬁrst column and
11.9%. The ﬁnal column reports how much such program would cost on a national level, put in
annual, per-capita terms.
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Table 4: Country Characteristics
HIV Prevalence (%) by Age and Gender1
Zambia Kenya Tanzania Ethiopia Rwanda
Men 20-24 5.0 2.1 1.8 0.4 0.5
Men 25-29 11.5 7.8 4.9 0.7 2.1
Men 30-34 17.0 6.5 7.6 1.9 4.1
Men 35-39 22.5 8.2 10.8 1.8 2.1
Men 40-44 24.0 8.9 6.3 2.8 7.1
Men 45-50 18.5 5.3 6.2 0.1 5.3
All Men 12.3 5.0 4.6 0.9 2.3
All Women 16.1 9.0 6.6 1.9 3.6
Other Country Characteristics
Zambia Kenya Tanzania Ethiopia Rwanda
Life Expectancy2 53 64 54 57 54
GDP per capita3 374 404 362 150 263
Year4 2007 2003 2008 2005 2005
1Source: Demographic Health Surveys.
2Non-AIDS life expectancy from infancy in 2008. Source: U.S. Census Bureau -
HIV/AIDS Surveillance 2008.
3Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
4The year for which the estimates are obtained, with the exception of life expectancy
which is for 2008 for all countries.
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Table 5: Country Parameter Calibrations
Parameter Description Zambia Kenya Tanzania Ethiopia Rwanda
γ1 Preference of sexual part-
ners for ages 20-34
0.226 0.112 0.068 0.011 0.028
γ2 Preference of sexual part-
ners for ages 35-49
0.153 0.073 0.060 0.013 0.038
h Probability sexual partner
has HIV
0.161 0.090 0.066 0.019 0.036
δ Prob. surviving non-AIDS
death risk
0.566 0.219 0.413 0.373 0.413
w Income for family of four,
over 15 years
22,440 24,240 21,720 9,000 15,780
τ Female-to-Male HIV trans-
mission rate
0.15
These parameters are held
constant across countries.
α Preference for personal con-
sumption
0.5
ν Elasticity of personal/family
substitution
2.0
Notes: With the exception of τ , α, and ν, these calibrations are chosen to match the characteristics suggested
by the date reported in Table 4 for the corresponding country. The most notable diﬀerence between these
parameters and those used earlier in the paper, is the larger value used for ν, the substitutability between
personal and family consumption. The preference parameters, γ1 and γ2, for Zambia are not the same as the
baseline parameters used earlier, because these parameters are re-adjusted for the new value of ν to result
in HIV prevalence rates that match the data reported in Table 4.
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Table 6: Deterrence Eﬀect by Country
HIV Prevalence (%) - No Life Insurance
Zambia Kenya Tanzania Ethiopia Rwanda
Ages 20-34 11.2 5.5 4.8 1.0 2.2
Ages 35-49 21.7 7.5 7.8 1.6 4.8
All Ages 11.9 4.1 4.5 0.9 2.4
HIV Prevalence (%) - With $20,000 Life Insurance Beneﬁt
Zambia Kenya Tanzania Ethiopia Rwanda
Ages 20-34 10.9 5.4 4.6 0.9 2.1
Ages 35-49 15.5 6.7 5.8 1.0 3.3
All Ages 9.9 3.8 3.8 0.7 1.9
Reduction (%) 16.6 6.4 14.7 24.6 20.14
Annual Cost $38.40 $19.81 $37.22 $34.00 $37.45
Notes: This table reports the predictions of the model for HIV prevalence
under no life insurance, and when there is a $20,000 life insurance beneﬁt that
is paid out if a non-HIV related death occurs immediately after the second
period (age 50). The predictions of the model for HIV prevalence rates under
no insurance beneﬁts for the ﬁrst two age groups match averages from the
data presented in Table 4. The second to last row reports the percentage
reduction in the number of all males with HIV that can be achieved with the
life insurance policy. The last row reports the per-capita annual cost of such
a nationalized life insurance program.
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Figure 1: Dynamics of Risky Behavior and HIV: Preference Parameters
Parameter Number of Sexual Partners HIV Prevalence
γ1
γ2
α
ν
These plots illustrate the utility maximizing choice for the number of sexual partners, and the resulting
HIV prevalence rates, for ranges of calibrations for the preference parameters. For each plot, all other
parameters are held constant at the values reported in Table 1. Parameters: γ1, Preference for Sexual
Partners during ages 20-34; γ2, Preference for Sexual Partners during ages 35-49; α, Preference for
Personal Consumption over Family Consumption; ν, Elasticity of Substitution Between Personal and
Family Consumption.
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Figure 2: Dynamics of Risky Behavior and HIV: Transmission Parameters
Parameter Number of Sexual Partners HIV Prevalence
h
τ
Note: These plots illustrate the utility maximizing choice for the number of sexual partners, and the
resulting HIV prevalence rates, for ranges of calibrations for parameters h and τ , the HIV prevalence rate
among potential sexual partners and the female-to-male HIV transmission rate, respectively. For each
plot, all other parameters are held constant at the values reported in Table 1.
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Figure 3: Dynamics of Risky Behavior and HIV: Income, Life Expectancy, and Life Insurance
Parameter Number of Sexual Partners HIV Prevalence
Income
Non-AIDS
Life
Expectancy
Life
Insurance
Payout
Note: The ﬁrst two rows of plots demonstrate how income and life expectancy impact the utility maxi-
mizing choice for the number of sexual partners, and the resulting HIV prevalence rates. For these plots,
all other parameters are held constant at the values reported in the ﬁrst column of Table 1. The third
row sets all parameters including life expectancy and income back to the baseline values, and illustrates
how the utility maximizing number of sexual partners and HIV prevalence rates for various levels of life
insurance paid out if death is not the result of AIDS.
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Figure 4: Interaction of Income and Life Expectancy
Note: This ﬁgure illustrates the eﬀect of the interaction of prolonged life expectancy and
increased income on HIV prevalence among adult males. The base of the three-dimensional
graph contains contour lines and shading to help illustrate the height of the ﬁgure. The
lighter is the shading at a particular point, the taller is the ﬁgure at this point. The greater
descent from right to left than front to back indicates that increased life expectancy is a
greater deterrent to risky behavior than increased income. The lowest point on the graph
(darkest shading) in the rear-left-hand corner indicates moving a country like Zambia into
a situation with high life expectancy and high income will result in a reduction of HIV
prevalence among adult males from 11.9% to almost 3%.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity of the Income Eﬀect to the Elasticity of Substitution
Note: This ﬁgure illustrates the deterrence eﬀect of increasing income on HIV prevalence
for various calibrations for ν, the elasticity of substitution between personal and family
consumption. The base of the three-dimensional graph contains contour lines and shading
to help illustrate the height of the ﬁgure. The lighter is the shading at a particular point, the
taller is the ﬁgure at this point. For each value of ν, a search is conducted for new calibrations
of γ1 and γ2 so that at the baseline level of income, the resulting HIV prevalence rates among
males 20-34 and 35-49 matches the data reported in Table 2, which leads the model to predict
the HIV prevalence rate among all adult males is 11.9%. The graph implies a very small
response to risky behavior when ν = 1, and the deterrence eﬀect of higher income completely
disappears as personal and family consumption become substitutes (ν > 1).
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Figure 6: Sensitivity of Life Expectancy Eﬀect to the Elasticity of Substitution
Note: This ﬁgure illustrates the deterrence eﬀect of increasing life expectancy on HIV
prevalence for various calibrations for ν, the elasticity of substitution between personal and
family consumption. The base of the three-dimensional graph contains contour lines and
shading to help illustrate the height of the ﬁgure. The lighter is the shading at a particular
point, the taller is the ﬁgure at this point. For each value of ν, a search is conducted for
new calibrations of γ1 and γ2 so that at the baseline level of life expectancy, the resulting
HIV prevalence rates among males 20-34 and 35-49 matches the data reported in Table 2,
which leads the model to predict the HIV prevalence rate among all adult males is 11.9%.
The graph shows there are quantitatively small diﬀerences in the deterrence eﬀect over a
large range for ν. The lowest point on the graph (and therefore the darkest shading on the
base) occurs when ν is small, indicating that the deterrence eﬀect is largest when personal
and family consumption are not substitutes.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity of Life Insurance Eﬀect to the Elasticity of Substitution
Note: This ﬁgure illustrates the deterrence eﬀect of increasing life insurance beneﬁts (paid
out for any premature non-HIV related death) on HIV prevalence for various calibrations
for ν, the elasticity of substitution between personal and family consumption. The base of
the three-dimensional graph contains contour lines and shading to help illustrate the height
of the ﬁgure. The lighter is the shading at a particular point, the taller is the ﬁgure at this
point. For each value of ν, a search is conducted for new calibrations of γ1 and γ2 so that
at a baseline of zero life insurance beneﬁts, the resulting HIV prevalence rates among males
20-34 and 35-49 matches the data reported in Table 2, which leads the model to predict
the HIV prevalence rate among all adult males is 11.9%. The graph shows a quick, steep
decline in height moving front to back, indicating that as personal and family consumption
becomes substitutable, life insurance beneﬁts become a more eﬀective deterrence. For the
highest levels for ν, a life insurance beneﬁt of $100,000 can reduce HIV prevalence among
all adult males to about 6%.
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Figure 8: Response to HIV Prevalence to Various Life Insurance Availabilities
Payout Available if Death Follows
Periods 1, 2, or 3
Payout Available if Death Follows
Periods 2 and 3
Payout Available if Death Follows
Period 3
Payout Available if Death Follows
Period 2
Note: These ﬁgures illustrate the dynamics of the deterrence eﬀect of a life insurance beneﬁt up to $20,000
when limiting the payouts only to deaths occurring at speciﬁc ages.
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Figure 9: Deterrence Eﬀect of Life Insurance by Country
Zambia Kenya
Tanzania Ethiopia
Rwanda
Note: These ﬁgures illustrate the dynamics of the deterrence eﬀect of a life insurance beneﬁt up to $20,000
when life insurance beneﬁt is only available if a non-HIV related death occurs immediately following period
2 (age 50).
